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A D i c h o t o m i e D a t a b a s e o f L e g a l T o p o i 
Lothar Phi l ipps 
I. The database o f legal topoi is meant to help i n solving 
legal Problems. The w o r d "problem" is to be taken literally: that 
you fail to k n o w the Solution to a case - whereas an expert 
would k n o w it - does not yet constitute a p rob lem. 1 O n the 
other hand, the fact that you are i n a Posit ion to predict "what 
the courts w i l l do" (Olives Wendell Holmes) i n a certain case 
does not necessarily mean that the case i n not h ighly proble-
matic. 
A c c o r d i n g to a v i e w p o p u l ä r among scholars of "Computers 
and law", the p rob lem o f a case results f rom the deformation of 
a legal prototype. (These terms, f rom cognitive psychology, are 
used by M c C a r t y , whereas H a f t differenciates between Normal fa l l 
und P rob lemfa l l . I once spoke of Idealtyp and A b w e i c h u n g , 
fo l lowing M a x Weber. However , I would not think that these 
nuances are very important.) One reason for the populari ty of 
this case-focused v i e w is that Computers i n the near future w i l l 
not be able to get a feeling for the subtleties of natural 
language, w h i c h w o u l d be necessary for interpreting Statutes. 
However , i n compar ing cases the Computer can be of help today. 
A case is problemat ic i f the deviation f rom the prototype is 
great enough to raise doubt: should one decide according to the 
terms of the prototype, or should one practically outrule these 
terms? 
The question is how to determine whether a deviation is 
tolerable or not. I believe that there are several methods to 
evaluate deviations; here I would l ike to elaborate on a tech-
nique that I th ink many lawyers apply more or less subcon-
1 A s a matter o f fact, our topoibase was designed when we 
became aware o f the insufficiencies of a legal expert System 
wh ich for what it is doesn't work badly. M U L E - M u n i c h Lega l 
Exper t , b r i e f ly descr ibed i n my article: U s i n g an Exper t System 
i n Test ing L e g a l Ru les , in : Automated Analys is of Lega l Texts, 
edited by A . A . M a r t i n o et a l . , Amsterdam 1986, p.703-710. 
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sciously. Th is technique is deeply rooted at least i n the G e r m a n 
legal t radi t ion, and I think not only there: the Belgian legal 
philosopher C h a i m P e r e l m a n has described the phenomenon, as 
w e l l . 2 A n y h o w , I do not know whether or not and to what 
extent you can f i n d it i n the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n legal System. 
The first Step in approaching the case would be to split the 
prototype into two components; often these components w i l l be 
preformed by scholarly tradit ion. For instance, the Ge rman 
legislator has defined theft as Wegnahme einer fremden ... 
Sache, i n der Abs ich t , s ich dieselbe rechtswidrig anzueignen 
(removal of a foreign object w i t h the intention of unlawful 
aquisiton). Lega l scholars have split these terms as follows: 
Wegnahme = B r u c h fremden und B e g r ü n d u n g neuen Gewahrams 
(removal = breach of someone elses' custody and the founding of 
new custody). Gewahrsam = ta t säch l iche Herrschaftsmacht ü b e r 
eine Sache - die von einem Herrschafts wi l l en getragen ist 
(custody = actual possession of the object w i th the general w i l l 
to possess i t) . S imi la r ly , the intended aquisit ion is defined by 
Ente ignung (expropriation) and Aneignung (appropriation) of the 
object. The object as such is split into the two components of 
Substanz and Wert (substance and value). Fremdhei t is composed 
of the formal and the material (the legal and the economic) 
aspect of property. Last but not least, ' in tent ion ' is defined 
dualist ically: by knowledge and desire, the intellectual and the 
'voluntat ive ' component. 
Eve ry competent lawyer has internalized dozens of such 
dualisms: ready to categorize the wor ld according to them. Fo r 
example: the act and its success, the intention and its declara-
t ion, the legal power and the legal right ( H o h f e l d ) . A s a 
pr inc ip le , they are variations of the fundamental philosophical 
dualisms of fo rm and content, exterior and interior, object and 
subject, reality and value. P e r e l m a n n Claims that al l o f them are 
paraphrases of the Piatonic differentiat ion between Form and 
Matter . Indeed the resemblance is s t r ik ing. 
However , you need not turn to P l a t o : it is quite natural i n 
the case o f an argument that one party takes the objective, the 
2 Juristische L o g i k als Argumentationslehre, F re ibu rg -
M ü n c h e n 1979, p. 178. 
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other the subjective stand " Y o u shot my dachshund!" - T m so 
sorry, I thought it was a fox about to invade my henhouse." 
" M y employee was not al lowed to sign the contract w i th you!" 
- "Wel l , I had to rely on the letter of authorisation you gave to 
h im." 
The point of these dualisms is that the two aspects do not 
exclude, but compliment each other. The prototype has both 
aspects: normally, the thief w i l l be interested i n substance and 
value of the taken object. Sometimes however only one aspect 
holds: the thief ( i f any!) restitutes the object after having it 
devaluated: he gives back the savings book after plundering the 
bank aecount. Then we have a problem (this time not for the 
legal practice, but s t i l l for some scholars). 
I f the deviation goes so far as to cover both aspects, one 
can no longer seriously evaluate it according to the prototype. A 
theft where the delinquent is neither interested i n the substance 
nor i n its value is hardly imaginable. 
The l ine o f legal argumentation is now visible: i n order to 
decide on a problematic case according to the prototype one 
has to point out that the remaining component is the essential 
one, whereas the missing one can be neglected. To take the 
opposite stand one has to demonstrate that it is the missing 
component that is dominat ing. 
A s we see, there are only two problematic arrangements. This 
can be used to construet a set o f related cases to heuristic 
purposes i n advance. 3 I mentioned above the problem of the 
resti tution of a devalued substance (e.g. savings book, train 
t icket) . Exchanging the components of the case we get the 
Problem of restituting the value but not the substance: e.g. 
changing a hundred mark b i l l against the w i l l of the owner. If 
you deny theft i n this case, imagine the fo l lowing one: A drug 
addict happens to notice a pack of prescribed pain relievers 
ly ing on a pharmacist's counter. Leav ing an appropriate b i l l 
beh ind , he takes o f f w i th the drug. 
3 F o r details, see Philipps, K o m b i n a t o r i k strafrechtlicher 
Lehrmeinungen , in : A . Podlech (Ed.) , Rechnen und Entscheiden-
Mathematische Mode l le jurist ischen Argumentierens, B e r l i n 1977, 
p. 221-254. 
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II. Af t e r having decided to stay i n line w i th the prototype or 
to divert f rom i t , it wou ld only be natural to lay down as w e l l , 
i n w h i c h direct ion one has decided to divert or not to d iver t . I 
feel that up to now one has designed databases for decisions too 
much l ike databases for literature. A court decision on theft, 
however, is something very different f rom an article on the 
legal history of theft. It is always a decision pro and contra. A 
decision pro theft is at the same time a decision contra f raud, 
or contra robbery, or contra embezzlement, or contra the taking 
of a corpse (think of a mummy) , or against a case o f mere 
fur tum usus, w h i c h as a rule is not punishable. 
F r o m the Standpoint of Computer science, the fo l lowing is 
t r iv i a l , but nevertheless worth remembering f rom time to time: 
If I search my database for decisions on theft and not f raud, I 
w i l l not get decisions pro theft and contra fraud, but those 
decisions that contain the word 'theft' and not the word ' f raud ' . 
So I have to search for theft and f raud, but now I w i l l receive 
al l decisions where both the words 'theft ' and ' f raud ' are 
mentioned, among them many I w i l l not need. 
A retrieval System suitable for decisions can be easily 
obtained by Splitting the co lumn for Solutions d ichotomical ly i n 
'pro ' and 'contra ' or 'ascribed category' and 'denied category'. 
N o w it is easy to f i n d a l l decisions i n w h i c h theft is marked o f f 
f rom fraud or, for that, f rom robbery. Contrary to the f o r m of 
topoi dichotomisation we began wi th , the dichotomisation of 
Solutions is not inclus ive , but exclusive (pro/contra). 
The essential question is whether it is possible to make this 
dis t inct ion easily, qu i ck ly , and wi th intersubjective evidence. 
This is the case especially as far as higher court instances are 
concerned. This follows f rom the mechanism of legal appealing. 
We have a lower court decision and an appeal against i t . A s a 
rule the higher court w i l l conf i rm either the previous decision 
or the appeal. Since a court decision has to be enforcable, it 
should be possible to extract its gist w i th certainty and f rom 
the first pages o f the document. B y dichotomising the f ie ld 'So-
lu t ion ' , one only revokes an unnecessary abandonment o f 
informat ion. 
